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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon of 
mathematical modelling in urban studies and to stimulate a deeper debate about the 
use  of  models  in  planning.  This  is  done  by  means  of  an  identification  of  key 
assumptions made in the process of the interpretation of reality as a set of algebraic 
relations; assumptions which, it is argued, underlie virtually the whole of mathematical 
modelling but which appear never to be openly discussed. An example of the use of 
these assumptions is then given in the theoretical development of the logit model of 
discrete choice, and the paper is concluded with preliminary recommendations about 
the future development and use of the mathematical model. 
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Resumen 
El  objetivo  de  este  trabajo  es  contribuir  a  la  comprensión  del  fenómeno  de  la 
modelación matemática en estudios urbanos y de estimular un debate más profundo 
sobre  el  uso  de  modelos  en  la  planificación.  Esto  se  hace  por  medio  de  una 
identificación de los supuestos básicos en el proceso de la interpretación de la realidad 
como un conjunto de relaciones algebraicas; supuestos que, se argumenta, la base de 
la  práctica  totalidad  de  los  modelos  matemáticos,  pero  que  parece  que  nunca  se 
discuten abiertamente. Un ejemplo de la utilización de estos supuestos se da entonces 
en  el  desarrollo  teórico  del  modelo  logit  de  elección  discreta,  y  el  documento  se 
concluye  con  recomendaciones  preliminares  sobre  el  futuro  desarrollo  y  el  uso  del 
modelo matemático. 
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1.- Introduction 
 
Much as in any aspect of social science, mathematical modelling has its enthusiasts 
and its sceptics. The enthusiasts accuse the sceptics of not understanding the models, 
and the sceptics in turn accuse the enthusiasts of not understanding the reality. As in 
the case of GIS therefore (Sheppard, 1995) the problem is perhaps not so much the 
rights and wrongs of modelling itself as the lack of communication between the two 
camps; to use the respective stereotypes, there are the intellectually insecure pseudo-
scientists versus the woolly-minded ignorants. 
 
A  stumbling  block  in  the  debate  is  a  certain  confusion  about  what  exactly  is  the 
phenomenon of modelling; opinions seem to range from those who believe it a means 
of justifying undemocratic decisiones but to not sure how, and those who believe it 
science  but  can’t  say  why.  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  stimulate  this  debate  by 
examining  the  roots  of  the  process  of  modelling,  and  suggest  future  directions  for 
research in the field. As a critique of modelling of urban systems, the intention is not, 
as in the famous paper of Douglass Lee (1973), to write their "requiem" so much as to 
re-visit  the  basics  (if  ever  they  have  been  visited)  before  the  probable  boom  in 
technical advance predicted by Openshaw (1995) materialises. This paper takes as a 
starting point a perspective more akin to that of Lee's less publicised contemporary 
Tribe  (1972, page  77),  who  states that  the  accepted  methodology  has  rested  upon 
"purely 'objective' modes of relation between the observer and object of observation," 
this premise, "deriving in part from insecurity about the intellectual credentials . . . . . 
of social science". 
 
 
2.- Is modelling objective science? 
 
What is science? Of course this depends on whom one asks. Amongst modellers there 
is  an  implicit  acceptance  that  it  necessarily  involves  the  use  of  mathematical 
description. Undeniably, the language of mathematics has its appeal. Once translated 
into this language, a description has properties which are independent of the observer; 
anyone who knows the language will be able to make the same deductions from the 
same description. However this property, of endogenous objectivity, is purely internal 
to mathematics - the interpretation of reality as mathematical structure per se cannot 
be  said  to  be  objective.  Exogenous  objectivity  of  this  latter  form,  a  property 
characteristic of 'hard' science, is not intrinsic to the mathematical language. The only 
case where it can be said to exist is when there exists a controlled and repeatable 
process of observation of the real phenomenon. This in itself has nothing to do with the 
use  of  mathematical  language  (except  for  the  requirement  that  the  language  must 
possess a degree of internal rigour). The fact that this is possible within definable error 
for many natural systems does not infer the right to model any system at any level of 
complexity  mathematically  without  such  a  process  of  observation,  and  claim 
objectivity. 
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This leads us to a useful definition of objective science for the purposes of this paper - 
that of a process of observation. One is not suggesting that other forms of science are 
less  valid;  there  is  an  increasing  body  of  work  for  example  in  urban  systems 
(exemplified  by  Allen  and  Sanglier  1981,  Batty  and  Longley  1989)  which  develops 
models as learning tools, without the same emphasis on predictive capacity. The issue 
here is not so much 'science or non-science' as the type of science to which modelling 
aspires.  Much  of  the  language  used  in  modelling  appears  to  suggest  that  this  is 
predictive, objective science. Phrases such as "models improve knowledge of reality" or 
"much can be learned from model behaviour" slip easily off the pen, but need more 
careful consideration. Mackett (1993) and Openshaw (1995), amongst many others fall 
into this type of trap; language of this sort implies a definite deduction of reality from 
the model which requires a degree of objectivity in the induction from that reality. Any 
objectivity possessed by a model arises from the property that observations made are 
repeatable by any observer at any place or time within experimental error. 
 
One  is  given  to  asking  how  many  models  of  urban  systems  are  subjected  to  such 
criteria,  and  how  many  would  stand  up  to  them.  The  common  disclaimer  that  one 
cannot apply the same degree of rigour to social systems is quite irrelevant; without 
the  same  degree  of  rigour  one  cannot  employ  the  same  methods  nor  the  same 
language  nor  the  same  concepts  with  the  same  degree  of  liberty  as  modellers 
frequently do. The difference between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences is deeper than just 
the size of the error term (see below discussion). To pick examples at opposite ends of 
the scale, one might consider: 
 
(a) Models of traffic flow. Given that in a single lane of traffic, one is analysing a 1-
dimensional movement in which the human influence is observable only in terms of 
distance, speed and acceleration, and in which the emotional motivation is a relatively 
simple  one,  it  may  be  possible  to  define  appropriate  limits  of  tolerance  and  to 
formulate  a  mathematical  expression  whose  predictions  may  be  falsifiable  by 
observation falling outside those limits. 
 
(b) Models of land-use. It is difficult to imagine a series of controlled experiments with 
urban development which could confirm numerical laws of long-term land-use changes. 
The basic problem is that the typical time scale of the development is similar to the 
evolutionary time scale of the system itself. In such ontogenetic systems, where the 
very rules themselves evolve with the system, it is generally impossible even to define 
useful limits to quantitative behaviour on a macroscopic scale. In the absence of such 
limits, it is by definition impossible to verify a model by any experiment. 
     
Of  course  there  exists  a  whole  range  of  models  within  these  two  extremes,  with 
varying degrees of verifiability. Given that there exist models of urban systems which 
are accepted and used (Klostermann, 1994), and which appear to be unverified in this 
manner, one must ask the question, "If not science, what?"  
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3. -So is it art? 
 
Continuing the theme of the process of observation, one might pause to consider as an 
answer to the above question the idea of art. In this instance, different qualities are 
valued in the observation of reality. Contrary to the observer-independence of science, 
an artistic interpretation is in general identified specifically with one person or group, 
and the more uniquely so the better. (One is here considering art in the contemporary 
Occidental egocentric interpretation.) The artist is expected to put their own distinct 
contribution to the work in a way that no other does, although their observation is 
expected  to  reflect  some  universal  or  common  truth  in  human  experience.  If  this 
contribution includes political or cultural bias, so be it. 
 
Acceptance of a work of art depends partly on this ability to invoke common intuition 
and partly also on certain peer group norms. These norms are not themselves fixed 
but evolve with innovation, technical advance and changing cultural environment. 
 
There are interesting parallels between this description of art and the dynamic of the 
modelling community. 
 
Whilst  there  are  ideas  of  seeking  universal  qualities  in  the  description  of  urban 
systems,  there  is  also  a  great  diversity  of  styles  and  individual  interpretations,  as 
Wegener (1994) and Webster et al (1988) demonstrate. This may be seen on the one 
hand as representing a positive creativity in approaches to a difficult problem, or on 
the other as evidence of niche-building, depending on one's point of view; however the 
fact that all these examples are considered legitimate efforts points to the existence of 
some form of peer group norms. Given that the relative looseness of empirical support 
removes an external point of reference, acceptance is much more dependent on the 
internal dynamic of the academic community and the language it employs. 
 
However, these parallels will only extend so far. An important difference is that in art 
there appears to be little consensus as to the existence of a fundamental, unassailable 
base from which all artistic activity is derived, as the ever more introspective extremes 
of postmodernism perhaps demonstrate. Mathematical modelling however contains an 
implicit,  accepted  interpretative  foundation  -  the  use  of  a  common  medium  of 
expression  (algebraic  language)  is  in  itself  sufficient  evidence  of  this.  However  this 
foundation, as  far  as  the  author  is aware, has  never  been  explicitly  stated  -  hence 
perhaps the confusion over the status of modelling. The next section will attempt to 
remedy this by setting out three key assumptions common to almost all modelling of 
urban systems, which between them form that foundation.  
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4.- The three canons of modelling 
 
A.-If you can count it you can calculate it 
 
There can be no assumption more fundamental to algebraic modelling than this, which 
relates a form of observation to the very concept of number itself. Mathematically it is 
not in fact always true. 
 
Mathematically, the process of counting consists of creating a bijective map (a one-to-
one  correspondence)  between  an  observed  set  of  objects  and  an  abstract  set  of 
discrete,  ordered  symbols,  thereby  assigning  to  the  observed  set  the  cardinality 
corresponding to the ultimate symbol used in the abstract one. (Cardinality is the set-
theoretic term for the ‘size’ of a set.) In everyday terms this means, for example, that 
we count the fingers on one hand by assigning to each in turn a member of the set N 
= {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . . . .} and when the fingers are exhausted taking the last-used 
member of N (usually 5) to represent the ‘number’ of fingers. However, one does not 
need to use the set N. Equally one could use {A, B, C, D, E, . . . .} or {glue, sporadic, 
knees,  glbpht,  dog-biscuit,  .  .  .  .}  and  the  result  (E  or  dog-biscuit)  would  be 
mathematically equally meaningful. The difference with the set N is that the symbols 
used have associated with them a spurious meaning due to their use in algebra. This 
meaning  is  derived  from  the  fact  that  that  there  exists  in  algebra  a  set  of  relation 
between the symbols, which are defined by a set of 15 axioms. These axioms define all 
the  commonly  understood  operations  of  addition,  subtraction,  multiplication  and 
division,  and  completely  define  the  properties  of  the  real  number  system.  The  real 
numbers themselves are defined by these relations and have no objective meaning as 
symbols outside of them. Now of these 15 axioms, only six suffice to define an ordered 
set of elements, basically those defining the relations of succession (symbolically <, = 
and >) which apply equally to any other ordered set such as those above mentioned as 
to the set N. The mere use of the symbols of the set N for counting does not allow one 
to infer the validity of the other 9 axioms, with all the algebraic relations they imply. 
 
Indeed this argument holds equally for any form of measurement other than counting. 
Given that any measurement has a finite precision, the process of measurement simply 
becomes one of counting the number of smallest observable increments. 
 
The  unique  justification  for  involving  the  other  9  axioms  is  when  the  relationships 
postulated can be confirmed by observation. 
 
A common example of this collapsing of a concept into a variable is the ‘benefit’ of 
cost-benefit analysis. In the evaluation of a road project for example, where benefits 
are associated with time savings, it is reasonable to suppose that for a given person at 
a given moment in time a quicker journey is preferable to a similar but slower one - 
implying an ordered relation between journey time and benefit. From this assertion, 
the assumption of calculability is deployed to create a numerical value of the ‘benefit’  
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of  an  individual  out  of  a  phenomenon  apparently  displaying  nothing  more  than  an 
ordering property. 
 
An instance where one could justify the use of real numbers is in the use of indicators. 
If one uses a mapping between observation and number which preserves an ordering 
property of the former, one can use the indicator arrived at for comparison between 
cases (as comparison uses only the relations <, = and >). However, the moment one 
begins to calculate figures from the same number, the indicator becomes a variable, 
relationships involving which need to be justified. For example, one may use average 
L10  noise  level  as  an  indicator  of  acoustic  pollution  in  an  area,  for  purposes  of 
comparison with other areas. If this figure is used to predict, say, house prices in that 
area  however,  there  is  immediately  a  more-than-ordering  relation  with  other 
quantities. 
 
This assumption of calculability is the that upon which the entire process of modelling 
is founded. Given that this assumption has been made therefore, and that algebraic 
relations are to be employed, a second crucial assumption is then made: 
 
B.- It’s not what you leave out but what you put in that matters 
 
The second assumption relates to the obvious idea that what is left out of the model is 
either constant or negligible. This is an assumption universal to any form of model (if 
one builds a miniature replica of a building, one might assume that not reproducing 
every  fibre  in  the  carpets  will  not  detract  from  the  model’s  usefulness)  but  in 
mathematical terms it has a specific interpretation. 
 
Taking a general form of model (one does not claim it to be the most general, merely 
to be illustrative) to be a relation of the type: 
xi = fi(x1, x2, x3, . . . xn, t) i = 1, . . . , m 
- two things are immediately obvious. One is that the choice of variables x1, x2, x3, . . . 
xn, t will determine the phenomena included in the model as a whole, the other is that 
for any given function fi, the arguments of that function will determine the possible 
interactions with the variables. These define the limits of the model. Everything not 
explicitly  included  is  assumed  disjoint,  constant  or  negligible  by  default.  It  is  this 
process of assumption by default which is the aspect of this assumption least often 
recognised. 
 
It is normal when building a model to think in terms of choosing interactions, but in 
doing so one is implicitly also choosing invariances. The choice of connections is an 
active one and the choice of eliminations a passive one. However, given the concept of 
a model as a simplification of reality, it would be more logical to make the choices the 
other way round, i.e. passively assume no invariances and actively eliminate possible 
interactions  one  by  one,  taking  into  account  what  is  lost  each  time.  One  might 
characterise this as a "top down" approach as opposed to the normal "bottom up" one. 
 
The  assumption  implicit  in  the  bottom  up  approach  is  that  with  every  functional 
relation added, the model gets in some sense ‘better’. What is better (or worse) in  
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modelling terms is not always defined explicitly, but generally tends to appeal to the 
idea of accuracy. This is a back-justification of the first mentioned assumption; in the 
concept  of  accuracy  is  implicit  the  idea  that  a  ‘perfect’  model  exists,  one  that  will 
generate  numerical  outputs  which  correspond  to  observed  values  within  some  pre-
specified  error.  These  outputs  may  be  phenomena  clearly  non-numerical  and 
unobservable,  such  as  the  above  example  of  benefits  of  a  project,  but  the  idea  of 
accuracy is employed regardless. Even when the outputs of the model are observable 
quantities, the difference between the observed and calculated values, if they are due 
to  qualitative  misconceptions  in  the  model,  cannot  be  treated  as  merely  numerical 
errors. The idea inherent in the bottom up approach is that as one adds more factors 
into the model, it will somehow converge to this ‘perfect’ model. It is logical to suppose 
that with the top down approach that elimination of factors (numerical or otherwise) 
will somehow diminish the representational power of a model, but the converse is not 
necessarily true with the bottom up one. There may not be some path-independent 
process  that  necessarily  leads  to  an  ideal  point,  but  an  infinity  of  possible  paths 
diverging  to  quite  different  models.  The  idea  of  the  model  as  an  approximation  of 
reality,  without  any  recognition  of  the  significance  of  ‘proximate’,  persists  however, 
and leads to us to the third fundamental assumption. 
 
C.- That which is not deterministic must be probabilistic 
 
This  assumption  relates  to  a  way  of  disguising  the  previous  two,  by  treating  any 
numerical discrepancy between model and reality as mere random error. 
 
If  the  idea  of  ‘approximation’  is  used  to  hide  the  assumption  of  the  existence  of 
algebraic relations, this is in turn hidden by the idea of the ‘error term’. The error term 
is  supposedly  a  random  term  frequently  added  onto  the  end  of  equations  to 
acknowledge  the  modeller’s  ignorance  of  the  real  system.  In  the  case  where  the 
equation calculates an observable quantity (i.e. not a fictitious variable such as utility, 
as in the below example) it is obviously tautological to say that the error term makes 
the  equation  numerically  correct;  given  a  sufficiently  loose  (and  therefore 
meaningless) definition of the error term, any equation using one can represent any 
quantity correctly. The value of the error term therefore resides entirely in its precise 
definition. 
 
In the physical sciences, it is common for the error to appear in terms of limits. These 
limits describe uncertainty in the observations, which will translate into corresponding 
uncertainty in predictions. Probability appears when for a sufficiently large number of 
controlled  experiments  on  an  isolated  system,  observational  errors  due  to  limited 
precision  of  measurement  or  sampling  error  can  be  assumed  to  follow  some 
distribution subject to the laws of probability. 
 
Now  probability  is  a  quantity  which  can  only  be  defined  under  either  one  of  two 
conditions: 
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(i) if one has an a-priori idea of equiprobable outcomes, based on knowledge of the 
system’s dynamics, e.g. if a coin has two equal faces, the probability of tossing heads 
equals 0.5. 
 
(ii) if one can perform a series of experiments in which the normalised distribution of 
the outcomes always tends to the same distribution. 
 
It ought to be obvious that in the social sciences, there are many phenomena which 
are  not,  at  least  at  any  observable  level,  deterministic.  However,  neither  can  one 
consider them probabilistic (at that level) unless one of these conditions holds. There 
are  many  instances,  for  example  in  economic  theories  (see  example  below)  where 
although  neither  condition  holds,  the  idea  of  probability  is  used  to  patch  up 
conceptually contentious models. To deterministic and probabilistic must be added a 
third  category  of  system,  the  indeterminate,  whose  definition  depends  on  the 
observability  of  the  system’s  behaviour.  At  the  level  at  which  we  observe  social 
systems, non-deterministic does not therefore imply probabilistic. 
 
An argument commonly used for such use of the error term is that the error accounts 
for the modeller’s ignorance of the ‘exact’ value of a variable. However ignorance is no 
excuse for employing notions of probability in models - on the contrary the definition of 
a probability actually requires a-priori knowledge. An error term, where meaningful at 
all, cannot necessarily be assumed probabilistic. 
 
As an aside, many models using this concept of assumed probability, such as the logit 
model below analysed, are very often totally deterministic. Variables are assigned error 
terms with a fixed distribution, and an optimum outcome (referred  to as the "most 
probable"  outcome)  calculated.  This  is  merely  a  deterministic  model  with  extra 
parameters, those describing the distributions assumed. To call it probabilistic without 
qualifying the assumptions made in using the word may be at least misleading, and 
possibly  wrong.  The  outcome  of  such  a  model  is  always  the  same,  unlike  the 
unambiguously  probabilistic  type  of  model  where  the  outcome  depends  on  some 
random number generator called by the model. This latter class of model, exemplified 
by the already mentioned examples of the urban evolution model of Allen and Sanglier 
(1981)  and  the  fractal  growth  model  of  Batty  and  Longley  (1989),  represents  a 
genuine recognition of ignorance of the influence of small-scale events. This contrasts 
with  that  school  of  thought  which  assumes  that  these  events  result  in,  or  are 
subservient  to,  macroscopic  forces  which  always  drive  to  model  to  some  invariant 
optimum solution as calculated by maximum likelihood methods, e.g. Anas (1982, ch 
4). However, the difference between a random model and a model of randomness still 
fails  to  be  recognised  in  many  cases,  such  as  in  so-called  "random  utility"  theory 
(Manski, 1977) or its complement "random bidding" theory (Lerman & Kern, 1983).  
 
The aforementioned idea of equilibrium is closely tied to that of probability. On the one 
hand it is explicitly a feature of the idea that (for example) an urban system will, like 
some  isolated  thermodynamic  system,  tend  to  some  entropy-maximising  ‘optimal’ 
state  dependent  on  the  probabilities  assigned.  Miyagi  (1986)  in  fact  shows  a 
mathematical equivalence between random utility and entropic models. On the other  
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hand  it  is  implicit  in  the  assumption  that  probabilities  exist.  Given  that  no  clear 
equiprobable outcomes exist for a given process, one needs to invoke condition (ii) 
above  to  be  able  to  define  a  probability.  Clearly,  to  be  able  to  observe  such 
probabilities,  one  would  need  to  observe  (or  theoretically  be  able  to  observe)  a 
tendency towards a steady state which is not influenced by external processes, i.e. an 
equilibrium state. The concept of probability therefore brings on board an implicit idea 
of equilibrium which may not always be recognised, or desired. 
    In summary therefore, far from being a catch-all assumption which corrects flaws in 
imperfect  knowledge  or  a  genuine  recognition  of  observational  errors,  the  use  of 
probability  brings  with  it  a  basket  of  other  implicit  assumptions  which  may  well 
compound the conceptual error. 
 
 
5.- Example - the logit model 
 
As a means of illustrating the modelling process as represented by the aforementioned 
three  canons,  we  shall  consider  here  the  conceptual  development  of  a  model 
commonly used to describe (among other things) urban localisation, the logit model of 
discrete choice. (See various examples in Webster et al, 1988). 
 
This typically has the form: 
 
     
where: pi is the ‘probability’ that the actor chooses option i, 
 
Uj is the expected ‘utility’ associated with option j, 
 
xj is a vector of attributes possessed by option j. 
 
The first assumption, that of quantifiability, is deployed in the creation of the utility 
variable - a classic example of the use of all 15 axioms without any apparent attempt 
at  justification.  In  the  formative  debate  on  utility  theory,  Kaldor  (1939,  page  551) 
stated  of  the  economist  that,  ".  .  .  the  scientific  status  of  his  prescriptions  is 
unquestionable, provided that the basic postulate of economics, that each individual 
prefers  more  to  less,  a  greater  satisfaction  to  a  lesser  one,  is  granted,"  and  this 
remains ingrained in current orthodoxy. 
 
The  relations  Kaldor  invokes  here,  of  more/less,  greater/lesser,  are  relationships 
merely of ordering. Despite this, although utility is rarely assigned an actual value, it is 
typically treated as an algebraic variable, which implicitly therefore has a numerical 
value subject to arithmetic operations. Similarly to the case of ‘benefit’ given above, 
the  supposition  that  at  any  given  moment  the  options  available  to  a  person  are  in 
some  way  ordered  according  perceived  ‘satisfaction’  is  reasonable  enough,  but  the  
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conceptual  leap  from  ordering  to  quantification  seems  in  general  to  be  made 
unthinkingly. 
 
A  good  attempt  at  justifying  this  conceptual  leap  may  be  found  in  Ben-Akiva  and 
Lerman (1985, pg. 39). Considering consumption bundles Q
i = {q1, . . . , qn} where qk 
represents the quantity of good/service k, they define rational behaviour in terms of a 
"transitive preference ordering" of the form 
Q
i ³ Q
j & Q
j ³ Q
k Þ Q
j ³ Q
k (1) 
 
They deduce from this the existence of an ordinal utility function U = U(q1, . . . , qn) 
which (whilst correctly distinguishing it from a cardinal one) in their words, "expresses 
mathematically the consumer’s preferences and is unique up to an order preserving 
transformation" (page 40). 
 
What  does  this  phrase  "order  preserving  transformation"  mean?  It  means  that  the 
preferences described by the transitive ordering (1) can be described by any function 
of the quantities q1, . . . , qn for which the corresponding values of U(Q
i) maintain the 
same order as in (1). This by implication includes numerical functions which fulfil this 
condition  as  a  subset  of  these  ordinal  functions.  However,  in  any  given  case,  the 
existence of a numerical function of q1, . . . , qn displaying the same ordering as (1) is 
not the issue; this is in general a trivial matter. If the function U is cardinal, then so 
must be the corresponding transformation - the assumption has merely been shifted 
from the existence of the utility function to that of this transformation. For the model 
to  be  representative  of  real  choices,  the  order  would  have  to  be  further  preserved 
under the process of aggregation and all the transformations in the model; this will not 
be guaranteed merely the by existence of such a function U. In this example therefore, 
the  assumption  is  not  eliminated,  merely  concealed  within  the  nuances  of  the 
descriptive language employed. 
 
The  second  assumption,  that  of  the  interactions,  manifests  itself  in  the  choice  of 
attributes xj. Conversely, as stated above, this is also the choice of invariances, i.e. 
what attributes, quantitative of qualitative, are not included. 
 
Utility may be intuitively defined as the perceived satisfaction derivable from a given 
option. Given the subjectivity of ‘satisfaction’ it is inevitable that the definition relies 
somewhat on intuition. Therefore, intuition being the intrinsically holistic phenomenon 
that it is, it makes more sense to start with the intuitive concept and ask what one 
loses by subtraction than to try to construct ‘satisfaction’ from scratch. 
 
An appropriate metaphor might be finding out how a car works. A person who has no 
idea about mechanics might go about learning by two ways. Either they might piece by 
piece dismantle a vehicle, finding what properties are lost each time (the "top down" 
approach) or they might go to their local hardware store and try to build what they 
think is a car from the bits and pieces they find there (the "bottom up" approach). 
 
Most people would think the top-down method more sensible; however the bottom-up 
one appears to be the dominant paradigm in modelling. In terms of the car metaphor,  
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utility  is  would  be  equivalent  to  some  variable  (or  perhaps  a  transformation  of  a 
variable) such as ‘car-ness’, which has a value of 1 for a complete vehicle and close to 
0 for most other objects. The bottom-up approach implicitly assumes that adding a 
further  component  to  the  assemblage  will  augment  its  car-ness,  making  it  tend 
towards the limiting value of 1. However, this of course ignores the multi-dimensional 
nature of the functional relationships; adding a windscreen wiper to the glove box will 
not contribute to the authenticity of the vehicle. Likewise, adding more attributes to a 
utility function may not improve its representation of satisfaction. 
 
The same metaphor is also useful for illustrating the third assumption, that of random 
error.  Imagining  the  motley  assemblage  of  washing  machine  spares  and  garden 
implements which an incompetent modeller might have constructed to represent a car, 
the error term would be equivalent to a magic component which is capable of taking on 
any guise such that it ‘corrects’ the numerical difference between the "car-ness" of the 
assembly  and  1.  It  of course  cannot  correct  the  inappropriateness  of  car-ness as  a 
useful description of a car. 
 
In the present example, the logit model calculates ‘probabilities’ of different choices 
based on the assumption of a certain form for the error term attached to the utility 
function. This form however, the Gumbel (or Weibull) distribution, is not based on a-
priori knowledge of the utility; as Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985, pg. 104) state, "the 
assumption that the disturbances are Gumbel distributed . . . . is used only for reasons 
of analytic convenience." (The convenient property is that the maximum of a set of 
Gumbel-distributed variables is also Gumbel-distributed.) 
 
Thus  the  logit  model  cannot  be  said  to  calculate  choice  probabilities;  rather  it 
constitutes  (in  the  discrete  choice  case)  a  partition  function  of  individual  choices, 
deterministically  optimised  over  a  set  of  fixed  'acceptability'  functions  (the  Gumbel 
distributions, whose  common dispersion parameter determines the  sensitivity of the 
calibrated model to the dispersion of the data). 
 
This example serves to illustrate the anatomy of the modelling process. The purpose is 
not to rubbish the logit model; it makes no more nor less sense to say the model is 
"rubbish" than to say it is "accurate" or "correct". The intention is simply to shed some 
light on the interpretation process which is modelling. 
 
 
6.- What price a science of modelling? 
 
As  argued  above,  claims  of  mathematical  modelling  to  be  scientific  will  always  be 
debatable without deeper understanding of its basic premises. The hypothesis of this 
work, which requires a range of analysis and case studies far broader than is possible 
in  any  one  paper,  is  that  the  three  above  identified  assumptions  between  them 
underpin almost all modelling, and may be made unthinkingly. One is often expected 
to accept them without attempt at rigorous empirical justification of the model, as in 
the case of land-use models. Mere calibration on a specific case does not constitute 
justification of the assumptions employed; the model may thus become an economical  
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description of the data but will still be a subjective one. Validation on an independent 
data set will improve the situation, but only if the data covers all possible situations for 
which the model might be used. In any science, the best a model can do is set limits of 
outcomes within known numerical error, and if the errors are qualitative or are due to 
unknown causes, limits cannot be  set and the model can have no  pretension to be 
either predictive or objective. 
 
Does it matter whether or not a model can be said to be objective or not? The answer 
is  no  -  for  as  long  as  the  model  is  not  used  to  support  planning  decisions  which 
influence people’s lives. In this case it becomes highly important that the model as a 
phenomenon be understood in its entirety, both in its derivation and its effects. Wachs 
(1985) discusses the use of models in planning in the light of such effects. The mere 
assertion  that  a  model  is  the  "best  we  have"  does  not  justify  its  use  in  decision-
influencing  without  this  understanding  -  in  the  absence  of  which  the  word  "best" 
cannot be meaningful. 
 
A consciousness of urban systems involving modelling would therefore be unlikely to 
be simply a matter of numerical description; rather it would have to include: 
 
(i)  a  science  of  the  process  of  observation  and  interpretation  of  the  urban  system, 
which seeks to actively discover the intrinsic gains and losses of the processes, and not 
passively ignore them. 
 
(ii) an understanding of the effects of the use of the model, via decision making, on 
the urban system itself. 
 
 
7. Which direction for modelling therefore? 
 
Currently, the common expectations for modelling are mainly restricted to the realm of 
technical development - increased  power and sophistication of computing equipment, 
better algorithms for solving numerical problems and so on. The orthodox answer to 
criticisms about modelling has thus become to state that in n years time we will be 
able to do it faster and better (the latter being an appeal again to the often spurious 
idea  of  accuracy).  Most  vocally  amongst  these  is  Openshaw  (1994,  1995),  but  one 
might  add  Mills (1987, p711), Birkin  et  al  (1995)  and  many  others.  Such  technical 
advance is to be applauded, but ought not to be allowed to lead to a generation of 
modellers  who  have  no  deeper  understanding  of  mathematics  than  the  ability  to 
manipulate formulae and program computers. To slip into the mentality of "we've done 
all the philosophy years ago, now there's just the numbers left to do" may simply lead 
to adding floors to a building without foundation. This is not to question the undoubted 
value  of  contributions  such  as  the  regularly  cited  Wilson  (1970)  or  Domencich  and 
McFadden (1975), merely to contend that their pleasing theoretical roundness does not 
necessarily  mean  that  the  "totality  of  the  phenomenon  [of  urban  activity]  could  be 
explained," as suggested by De la Barra (1995, page 250; this author's translation of 
quote). The fundamental debate must be kept open. 
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A problem in this is a certain stigma attached to subjectivity - a common perception 
being  that  subjectivity  precludes  any  possibility  of  the  existence  of  a  science  of 
planning. This perhaps represents a laudable desire for impartiality in planning, but 
impartiality is not the same as objectivity. A person who supports neither team in a 
drawn football match may be impartial, but their opinion about which team was better 
would still be subjective, depending on aesthetic preferences of style, seating position 
in the stadium etc. Equally, a modeller might have no preference for model A or model 
B on technical grounds, but if the assumptions made in the two are different, there is 
still  a  subjective  choice  to  be  made,  which  may  have  unforseen  consequences  in 
resultant planning decisions. However, if this subjectivity in itself becomes a legitimate 
subject  for  study,  there  is  no  reason  why  a  science  of  some  sort  should  not  be 
possible. 
 
Modelling  of  social  systems  must  therefore  embrace  subjectivity,  not  just  as  a 
necessary  evil,  but  as  a  positive  asset,  as  in  the  arts.  The  more  that  modelling  is 
perceived  an  occult  activity  pursued  by  a  select  group  of  specialists  shielding  their 
arcane ‘knowledge’ from the public eye, the more it is likely to be criticised as elitist 
and anti-democratic.  
 
This phenomenon may extend well beyond the realm of urban planning; there exists a 
wealth of literature, typified by the popular contribution of Capra (1982), alleging a 
domination  of  politics  by  so-called  "economism"  of  a  highly  mechanistic,  and 
unsustainable,  nature.  Economism,  by  which  is  here  meant  the  metaphysical  belief 
system  which  connects  human  emotion  and  desire  to  highly  complex  mathematical 
descriptions of international commerce, may well be seen to be founded in the same 
three canons - this is left for speculation. 
 
The foregoing discussion leads to two principal recommendations: 
 
(1) That a fundamental requirement of a model is that it be transparent, i.e. that all 
the assumptions made be recognised and presented as an integral part of any results 
quoted  from  the  model,  and  their  influence  over  those  results  understood  where 
possible. 
 
(2) That the value of a model as a planning tool be judged on its ethical effects as part 
of the whole decision-making process, not on unsupported considerations of technical 
merit. 
 
Perhaps  a  cue  could  be  taken  from  visual  forms  of  modelling,  as  employed  in 
architecture or more participative forms of urban planning. Be it in 2 or 3 dimensions, 
a  visual  simulation  is  a  perfectly  transparent  representation  of  a  reality  existent  or 
projected. The assumptions are there for all to see - if the cars in an artist’s impression 
of an urban motorway appear six inches high compared to the happy pedestrians, one 
can laugh and say that the artist must have shares in a road construction company. If 
one sees nothing but a mysterious number labelled ‘benefit’ one can say nothing. 
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If  mathematical  modelling  means  that  the  artists  paint  by  numbers,  so  be  it.  The 
numbers however must not remain hidden by a glossy top coat. 
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